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APPLICATION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE
GOLAN HEIGHTS IS ANNEXATION
Asher Maoz*
I. INTRODUCTION: AN ASSESSMENT OF PROFESSOR SHELEFFS
ARGUMENT
Are the Golan Heights a part of Israel? The debate centers
on a very narrow issue: did the Israeli legislature intend to
annex the Golan Heights, and if so, did it succeed in carrying
out its intention? The parameters of the dispute having been
thus outlined, the question is which is the most appropriate
interpretation of the Golan Heights Law.
I concur with Professor Sheleff' regarding three issues,
and take issue with one. I concur with his claim that as a
matter of principle, international law does not recognize unilat-
eral annexation by an occupying state of the territory captured
by it as a result of war.' I also agree with his assumption that
* Senior Lecturer, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law
1. Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights Is Not
Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 333 (1994).
2. Id. at 336 n.10. Sheleff relies on the summary of the topic as it appears
in YORAM DINSTEIN, THE LAW OF WAR 210-11 (1983); see also YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENCE 157-58 (1988); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (Robert Jennings et al. eds., 1992); MALcOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 284, 287 (3d ed. 1991).
Regarding the question of the applicability of this principle to the territories
conquered by Israel during the Six Day War, see ESTHER R. COHEN, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 1967-1982, at 43 (1985); John N.
Moore, The Arab Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement
of International Disputes, in 2 THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT: READINGS 739, 760-63
(John N. Moore ed., 1974). Moore discusses the question of the rights of Egypt
and Jordan over the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank; territories
that they had conquered in the course of the War of Independence in 1948. He
concludes that, in the absence of an arrangement that can guarantee Palestinian-
Arabic self-determination in those territories, "[n]ineteen years of de facto control
may nevertheless give rise to substantial expectations" of a right, under interna-
tional law, "to protect . . . the 'ownership' expectations of a deprived state." Moore,
supra, at 762-63.
Professor Lauterpacht suggested that, since a distinction is made between a
war of aggression and a war of self-defense, the rule regarding unilateral changes
in territory resulting from the use of force is applicable only to the illegal use of
force. As a result, there is no prohibition to the annexation of territories that were
captured in a war of self-defense. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY
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in passing the Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, 3 the Knesset
purposely avoided openly declaring the annexation of the
Golan.4 Finally, I am a partner to the view that if indeed the
Golan Heights Law contains ambiguity and is unclear as to the
status of the Golan Heights, then it should be interpreted in
accordance with the declared principles of international law,
given the inherent assumption of Israeli law5 that the legisla-
PLACES 51-52 (1968). This view is shared by at least one other commentator. S.M.
Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INTL L. 344, 347 (1970). Contextu-
ally, however, it would seem that Schwebel, and possibly Lauterpacht, is referring
to the right of the defending state to retain possession of the captured territories
only for as long as they are necessary for its security. Its withdrawal therefrom is
conditional upon security arrangements that will guarantee that the territories
never again constitute a threat to its security. Id. at 345-46.
There are, moreover, expert opinions that the annexation of the Golan
Heights was illegal regardless of whether Israel acted in self-defense in response
to Syrian aggression. See, e.g., Peter Malanczuk, Das Golan-Gesetz im Lichte des
Anaexionsvrebots und der Occupatio Bellica, 42 ZAORV 261 (1982). Malanczuk con-
cedes that "whereas there is general agreement that international law prohibits
annexation after the illegal use of force, there are different views on the question
whether and under which conditions the attacked victor may incorporate territory
of the aggressor under the right to self-defense in the sense of Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter." Id. at 294. Additionally, Malanczuk states that "it is
necessary to distinguish the legality of the acquisition of territory from its validity
in international law." Nevertheless, Malanczuk concludes that "none of the possible
rules under which Israel could have gained title to the Golan, in spite of the ille-
gality of the act, apply in this case . . . . [Tihe Golan therefore, under internation-
al law is still Syrian territory under belligerent occupation." Id.
Parallel to the issue of the legality of Israel's annexation of the Golan
Heights is the dispute whether Israel is required to withdraw from all of the
territories it conquered during the 1967 war. Jurists adopting the position that
Israel is not required to withdraw claim that according to Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, Concerning Principles for a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East,
U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 2d mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/8226 (1967), Israel is required
to withdraw from "territories" and not from "the territories," notwithstanding the
repeated efforts to introduce the proper article "the" into the accepted version. See
EUGENE V. RoSTOw, PEACE IN THE BALANCE: THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLI-
CY 163-64 (1972); JULIUS STONE, No PEACE-NO WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39
(1968); Eugene V. Rostow, Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle
East, 64 AMi. J. INTL L. 64, 69, reprinted in Moore, supra, at 891; Schwebel, su-
pra, at 345 n.5. However, reference should also be made to the French version of
the UN Security Council Resolution 242 referring to a withdrawal from "des
territoires occupes lors du recent conflit." It should also be emphasized that the
decision recognizes the rights of all the states in the region to exist within "recog-
nized and secure boundaries." Cf. Karl J. Partsch, Israel and the Arab States, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 140, 147 (Installment 12, 1990).
3. 1981-1982 SEFER HACHUKKIM [S.H.] 61, translated in 36 LAWS OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL [L.S.I.] 7 (1981-1982).
4. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 336.
5. See Eichmann v. Attorney General, 16 Piskei Din [P.D.] 2033, 2041, trans-
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ture did not intend to contravene the provisions of internation-
al law.
Notwithstanding these statements, I am unable to accept
Professor Sheleff's main thesis, that the legislature did not
intend, and was not successful in annexing, the Golan Heights
to Israel.6 In my opinion, the legislature intended to annex the
Golan Heights to Israel, and was effective in doing so accord-
ing to Israeli law, even if it should turn out that Israeli law is
inconsistent with the provisions of international law.7
The Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, in the section relevant
for our purposes, states that "[t]he law, jurisdiction and admin-
istration of the state shall apply to the area of the Golan
Heights as delineated in the schedule." Professor Sheleff ar-
gues: "The Golan Heights Law does not amount to annexation
because it does no more than what is written therein; apply
Israeli law, administration and government to the Golan
Heights. 8
This claim rests on Professor Sheleff's assumption that
with the conquest of the Golan Heights a "legal vacuum"9
formed, and that the Israeli legislature intended to fill that
vacuum. Sheleff further argues that in reality, the Syrian
jurisdiction had "ceased to be an effective legal instrument"
even prior to the enactment of the Golan Heights Law, and in
that sense the law did not effect any real change."
His central argument in this context is that in legislating
the Golan Heights Law, the Knesset introduced the Israeli
legal system to a place where it was not previously valid."
According to Sheleff, nothing more was done, and the law
has no ramifications regarding the legal status of the
Heights. 2 Sheleff brings support for his claims from far and
wide-from Britain, the European Community, Scotland, Ja-
lated in 36 I.L.R. 5, 281 (Isr. Crim. App. 1961).
6. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 335.
7. See Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 280 ("But where such a conflict does exist it is
the duty of the Court to give preference to and apply the laws of the local Legis-
lature.").
8. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 337.
9. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 337.
10. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 338.
11. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 337.
12. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 338.
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pan, and the Native American tribes in the United States.13
According to Sheleff, by joining the European Community,
Britain agreed that its laws would, in certain areas, be subject
to the law of the European Community, and the decisions of
the Court of the Community, and it is undisputed that this did
not cause "the elimination of British sovereignty." 4 Sheleff
draws a similar conclusion from the recognition granted by the
United States government to the applicability of tribal law to
the Native American tribes in certain areas: "generally," recog-
nition of tribal laws was not construed as "a waiver of United
States sovereignty in the tribal territory, or as a recognition of
tribal sovereignty." 5 Finally, Sheleff adduces proof from the
fact that despite the Scottish unification with England, in a
manner that ostensibly constituted its annexation to England,
the Scottish legal system continued to be regarded as "a sepa-
rate jurisdiction that continued to be valid in that part of the
country."
16
None of the examples offered by Sheleff are convincing
with respect to the correctness of his thesis, and none of them
are analogous to the application of Israeli law to the Golan
Heights.
Even if we ignore the possible implications for state sover-
eignty of the application of a foreign law to the state in ques-
tion in Sheleffs examples, 7 the case of the Golan is not anal-
ogous. In each of the examples, the application of the foreign
law was effected with the consent of the state concerned. Thus,
the application of the foreign law in those situations would not
impair the affected state's sovereignty. To reach that conclu-
13. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 346-48.
14. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 347.
15. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 347.
16. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 348.
7. Sheleff refers to two decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
questions the thesis according to which the granting of legal autonomy does not
constitute the forfeiting of American sovereignty. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 347-48
& n.56. The doubt becomes more pronounced still with regard to the conclusion to
be drawn from the British joining the European Community. According to Sheleff,
"in doing so the Parliament waived some of the sovereignty of the state." None-
theless, it did not go to the extent of "the elimination of British sovereignty."
Sheleff, supra note 1, at 347. Compare LAWRENCE COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 129-35 (4th ed. 1990) with STANLEY A. DE SMITH,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 96-108 (Rodney Brazier ed., 6th ed.
1989) and EMLYN C. S. WADE AND ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 120-43 (Anthony W. Bradley et al. eds., 10th ed. 1985).
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sion, it is not necessary to bring support from abroad. The ex-
ample drawn from local experience, cited in Sheleffs article, is
sufficient: with the establishment of Israel, the Temporary
Council of the state determined that the law which existed in
Palestine as of the day of the establishment of the state, shall
remain in force in Israel." It cannot be disputed that this did
not constitute a waiver of the sovereignty of the newly born
state.' 9
This is not the case, however, when a state unilaterally
applies its own law to territory conquered from another state.
This kind of unilateral application constitutes a quintessential
act of sovereignty by the occupying state.
II. APPLICATION OF THE LAW OR ANNEXATION? - THE
ANALOGOUS CASE OF EAST JERUSALEM
A. The Legal Context of the Annexation of East Jerusalem
In determining whether application of Israeli law to the
Golan Heights amounts to annexation, it is illustrative to ex-
amine the analogous situation of the application of Israeli law
to East Jerusalem. In 1967, the Knesset passed section lB of
the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, which
states that "[tihe law, jurisdiction and administration of the
state shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel'0 designated by
the Government by order."2' This provision is basically simi-
lar to section 1 of the Golan Heights Law. When presenting
the amendment to the Law and Administration Ordinance for
the first reading in the Knesset, the Minister of Justice stated:
It is the Government's opinion... that in addition to the
control exercised by the I.D.F [Israel's Defence Forces], a
clear act of sovereignty exercised by the state is necessary for
the application of the law of the state in such a territory ....
Consequently, the government decided to request that the
Knesset pass the law that I am proposing, determining that
the law, jurisdiction and administration of the state shall
18. Law and Administration Ordinance (§ 11), 5678-1948, 1948 ITON RISHMI
[I.R.] 1 (Supp. I), translated in 1 L.S.I. 7 (1948).
19. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 348.
20. Eretz Israel is the Hebrew name for Palestine.
21. Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11), 5727-1967, 1966-
1967 S.H. 74, translated in 21 L.S.I. 75 (1966-1967).
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apply to any part of Eretz Israel designated by the govern-
ment by order.22
Following the enactment of section 11B, two additional
enactments were passed. First, the government issued the Law
and Administration Order (No. 1), 5727-1967,' applying Is-
raeli law to East Jerusalem, which was formerly under Jorda-
nian control. Second, the Municipalities Ordinance (Amend-
ment No. 6) Law, 5727-196724 was passed. This law was de-
signed to empower the Minister of the Interior to extend the
municipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem by way of a shortened
procedure of proclamation, and include therein all the areas in
which the government was to apply Israeli law.
The essence of the two laws was correctly described by
M.K. Shmuel Mikunis: "The two draft bills.., in fact autho-
rize the government to annex not only the Old City of Jerusa-
lem... but other cities as well. This is the legal authorization
for the government to perform a unilateral act without asking
or taking the other side into consideration."25
The legal literature has debated whether this was the
necessary outcome of the law. In attempting to interpret the
law in a manner consistent with the principles of international
law, Professor Yoram Dinstein pointed to the legislative omis-
sion of the term "annexation" as evidence that the application
of Israeli law in East Jerusalem does not constitute its annex-
ation, "although it is a far reaching measure."26 Professor
22. 49 DIvREI HAKNESSET [D.K] 2420 (1967).
23. 1966-1967 KOVETZ IIATAKKANOT [K.T.] 2690.
24. 1966-1967 S.H. 74, translated in 21 L.S.I. 75 (1966-1967); see also Procla-
mation on the Enlargement of the Area of Jerusalem Municipality, 5727-1967,
1966-1967 K.T. 2694.
25. 49 D.X. 2425 (1967).
26. Yoram Dinstein, Zion by International Law Shall Be Redeemed, 27
HAPRAXLIT 5, 7 (1971-1972); see also YORAMi DINSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE STATE 125 (1971). It is clear from Professor Dinstein's articles that he made
every effort to conclude that the law does not lead to the annexation of East Jeru-
salem in order to avoid "as much as possible any confrontation with the principles
of international law." In Professor Dinstein's opinion, such a confrontation would
be disastrous, a veritable "red flag waived in the face of the bull in the interna-
tional arena." In the same vein, Professor Feinberg wrote: "Israel did, it is true,
decide upon the administrative union of East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem; but
it did nothing that could be regarded as annexation of the territories occupied in
the defensive war of June 1967." NATHAN FEINBERG, THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COLLOQUIUM OF ARAB JU-
RISTS IN ALGIERS 116-17 (1970); see also JULIUS STONE, THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER
[Vol. XX:2360
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Yehuda Zvi Blum on the other hand argued that in the appli-
cation of Israeli law to East Jerusalem by virtue of the Law
and Administration Order (Order No. 1), 5727-1967,27 East
Jerusalem was conferred the same status as that of West Jeru-
salem."
Furthermore, the justices of the Supreme Court did not
agree regarding the consequences of this measureY.2 The ques-
tion arose whether East Jerusalem is "abroad" with respect to
the West Bank, and as such, whether the export of an antique
thereto would require a certification of the appropriate authori-
ties.0 Justice Haim Cohn refused to rule on the issue, stating
that it was "not a legal question, but rather a political one."
Justice Cohn did, however, note that "the thesis that the appli-
cation of Israeli law to a particular area, is equivalent to the
annexation of the area to the state of Israel, still requires
proof." In the Justice's opinion "there is ... nothing to prevent
the application of the law of Israel to the occupied territories
even in the absence of any intention to annex them to the area
of the state.""' On the other hand, Justice Yitzak Kahan ruled
unequivocally that "East Jerusalem... was annexed to the
state of Israel and constitutes part of its area."32 According to
Justice Kahan, this ruling is the consequence of the application
CEASE FIRE 11 (1967); cf. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 50-51.
27. 1966-1967 KT. 2690.
28. Yehuda Z. Blum, Zion Was Redeemed by International Law, 27 HAPRAKL1T
315, 317-18 (1971-1972). For a summary of the differing views on the matter, see
COHEN, supra note 2, at 38-42.
29. Ravidi v. Military Court, Hebron Zone, [24] 2 P.D. 419 (1969) (Isr.).
30. In accordance with the Jordanian Law, § 31 of the Provisional Ordinance
of Antiquities (No. 51), 5726-1966, and according to the Order Concerning the
Antiquities Ordinance (The West Bank Zone) (No. 119) 5727-1967. PROCLAMATIONS,
ORDERS AND APPOINTMENTS OF THE I.D.F. COMMAND IN THE WEST BANK ZONE
(No. 7) 259.
31. Ravidi, [24] 2 P.D. at 423. In an article published in 1988, Justice Cohn,
however, noted the following:
[Bloth the proclamation of the Minister of Defence according to the order
issued in 1948 and the order of the government according to the law
passed in 1967, are both acts of state par excellence, and as such require
prior consideration as well as a political decision, for both of the actions
were intended to convert the areas to which they related into part of the
area of the state of Israel.
Haim H. Cohn, The Status of Jerusalem in the Legal System of the State of Israel,
in TWENTY YEARS IN JERUSALEM, 1967-1987, at 246, 249 (Joshua Prawer & Ora
Ahimeir eds., 1988), reprinted in 1 HAIM H. COHN, SELECTED ESSAYS 361 (1991).
32. Ravidi, [24] 2 P.D. at 424.
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of Israeli law to East Jerusalem. He therefore had no doubt
that "the legislative intention was to authorize the government
to annex the territories of Palestine to the state of Israel."33
Justice Kahan's statement echoed opinions voiced by other
justices of the Supreme Court in previous cases.34 This deci-
sion, however, differs from previous decisions because in this
case the characterization of the application of Israeli law as
annexation was made by the majority of the justices presiding
over the case, while in previous cases the characterization was
made by individual justices. 5 Moreover, in contrast to previ-
ous petitions, the ruling on the question of annexation consti-
tuted an essential component of the Court's decision that East
Jerusalem was legally "abroad" in relation to the West
Bank.36 In fact, in a later decision of the Supreme Court, it
was stated unequivocally that the meaning of the application
of Israeli law to East Jerusalem was "the annexation of East
Jerusalem to the state and making it a part of the state."3 7
There is, moreover, a consensus among Israeli constitu-
tional jurists that the order made East Jerusalem "a territory
which for all intents and purposes is part of the area of the
state."38 This conclusion is also accepted by the international
33. Id.
34. See Hanzalis v. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate Religious Court, [23] 1 P.D
260, 269 (1968) (Isr.) (Halevi, J.), translated in 48 I.L.R. 93, 98, 5 ISR. L. REV.
120, 122 (1970); Nationalist Circles v. Minister of Police, [24] 2 P.D. 141, 174
(1968) (Isr.) (Berenzon, J.), translated and abridged in 6 ISR. L. REV. 257 (1971);
see also Ben Dov v. Minister of Religious Affairs, [22] 1 P.D. 440, 442 (1967) (Isr.)
(Pres. Agranat, J.), translated in 7 I.L.R. 472, 473.
35. The representative for the State argued specifically that the application of
the law, jurisdiction and administration "is equivalent to the annexation of East
Jerusalem to the territory of the State of Israel." Ravidi, [24] 2 P.D. at 421. Nor
did the representative for the petitioner dispute the annexation. Id. at 442. It was
for this reason that Justice Cohn decided to issue his ruling based on the mutu-
ally acceptable assumption, without adopting the position himself. Id. at 423. Jus-
tice Kahan expressly ruled in favor of the annexation without requiring an official
certificate from the Foreign Minister, and without relying on the agreement of the
parties. Id. at 424. Justice Alfred Witkon, on the other hand, determined the fate
of the petition by accepting the annexation of East Jerusalem "as an existing fact,"
and one which even the attorney for the petitioner did not dispute. Id. at 422.
36. Cf. Dinstein, supra note 26, at 6.
37. Awad v. Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, [42] 2 P.D. 424,
429 (1988) (Isr.) (Barak, J.) (relying on Ravidi).
38. AMNON RUBINSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
85 (4th ed. 1991); see also 2 CLAUDE KLEIN, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-17 (Andre Alen ed., 1992); MENACHEM HOF-
NUNG, ISRAEL-SEcURITY NEEDS VS. THE RULE OF LAW 285 (1991); Asher Maoz,
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community, and has given rise to a spate of decisions in the
institutions of the United Nations denying the legality of the
Israeli steps and calling for their revocation. 9
It should be emphasized that the borders of Israel were
never defined by law. Instead, Section 1 of the Area of Juris-
diction and Powers Ordinance, 5708-1948,4o provides the fol-
lowing:
Any law applying to the whole of the state of Israel shall be
deemed to apply to the whole of the area including both the
area of the state of Israel and any part of Palestine which the
Minister of Defence has defined by proclamation as being
held by the Defence Army of Israel.4'
There can be no disputing the fact that the application of
the law of Israel to territory so defined constitutes an annex-
ation of that territory to the area of the state. As a matter of
fact, this section of the law was enacted to enable annexation
to Israel-being the Jewish State as defined in the United
Nations General Assembly's partition of Palestine42-of any
part of Palestine located outside the boundaries of Israel.
That being the case, it is hardly conceivable that the territory
of Palestine as defined by the government in an order under
Israeli law should have a different status than the same piece
of territory defined by the Defence Minister as being occupied
Between the Allenby Bridge and the Western Wall, 3 IYUNEI MISHPAT 200, 205-07
(1973-1974). But see Dinstein, supra note 26.
39. See G.A. Res. 2254 (ES-V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A16798 (1967); G.A. Res. 2253 (ES-V), U.N. GAOR,
5th Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A16798 (1967); S.C. Res.
298, U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27 (1971); S.C. Res. 252, U.N.
SCOR, 23rd Sess., at 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1970); S.C. Res. 267, U.N.
SCOR, 24th Sess., at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1 (1970); see also Report of the
Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2254(ES-V) Relating to Jeru-
salem, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., Supp. for July-Sept. 1967, at 232-33, 239, 248-56,
U.N. Doc. S/8146 (1967).
40. 1948 I.R. 61 (Supp. I), translated in 1 L.S.I. 64 (1948).
41. Id.
42. G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131-32, U.N. Doc. A1519
(1947).
43. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 40; RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 80; Dins-
tein, supra note 26, at 6; Maoz, supra note 38, at 205; cf. Peter Malanczuk, Israel:
Status, Territory, and Occupied Territories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 149, 164; see also Attorney General v. Anonymous, 5
Psakim Mechoziim [P.M.] 123, 127 (1951) (Landau, J.) (Israeli criminal case).
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by the I.D.F. Professor Dinstein notes that "the Government
did not adopt the constitutionally correct method for the an-
nexation of territory: the application of the Area of Jurisdiction
and Powers Ordinance, 5708-1948,"44 and emphasizes that
section lB of the Law and Administration Ordinance, in con-
trast to the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance, does
not mention the extension of the "territory of the state of Isra-
el,"45 but rather the application of its law, jurisdiction and
administration alone. 6
It is unclear to me how there can be a unilateral applica-
tion of the law of a state to the territory occupied from another
state, without intending thereby to bring about the annexation
of the same territory. Moreover, the wording of section lB of
the Law and Administrative Ordinance is so strikingly similar
to that of section 1 of the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers
Ordinance that it is evident that they were intended for the
same purpose.47
The transfer of power from a minister of the government
to the government in its entirety, in order to confer Israeli law
on East Jerusalem does not change the resulting annex-
ation.4' The fact that, due to political considerations, the
44. See Dinstein, supra note 26, at 6.
45. See Dinstein, supra note 26, at 6.
46. See Dinstein, supra note 26, at 6.
47. Cf COHN, supra note 31, at 40; Malanczuk, supra note 43. On the face of
it the language of § lB is even broader than that of § 1 of the Ordinance. Cf
HAIM HOLTzMAN, SECURITY LEGISLATION IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS 27 (1968); Maoz,
supra note 38, at 206.
Dinstein and Blum disagree regarding the implications of the 1949 ceasefire
agreement between Israel and Jordan. Professor Dinstein is of the opinion that
this agreement, which determined the eastern border of the state, "has the force of
a peace treaty" which "created a permanent situation." Yoram Dinstein, Zion Was
Not Redeemed or 'No Demonstrations but Deeds," 27 HAPRAKLIT 519 (1971-1972).
Professor Blum, on the other hand, maintains that "the ceasefire lines did not
form international borders, and the parties had no intention of turning them into
those kinds of borders." Yehuda Z. Blum, East Jerusalem Is Non-Occupied Territo-
ry, 28 HAPRAKLIT 183, 185 (1972-1973); see also Yehuda Z. Blum, The Juridical
Status of Jerusalem, in 2 JERUSALEM PAPERS ON PEACE PROBLEMS (1974). The
dispute is of significance in evaluating the effect of the annexation of East Jerusa-
lem to the territory of the State in the eyes of the international law. However, it
does not reflect upon the intention of the Knesset in the adoption of the stated
pieces of legislation.
48. Arguably, this may compensate for the absence of the terms "Area of
Jurisdiction and Powers" appearing in the title of the 1948 Ordinance. See Law
and Administrative Ordinance (§ 11), 5708-1948, 1948 I.R. 1 (Supp. 1), translated
in 1 L.S.I. 7 (1948); cf Maoz, supra note 38, at 206 n.42.
1994] LEGAL STATUS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS 365
Knesset refrained from resorting to the existing ordinance, and
Israeli representatives in international forums denied the
government's intent to annex,49 makes no difference to the
meaning of the law. In his explanatory remarks when present-
ing the law to the Knesset, the Minister of Justice stated un-
equivocally that the use of section lB was intended to obtain
the same result as would have been obtained by the Minister
of Defence exercising his authority by virtue of the Area of Ju-
risdiction and Powers Ordinance; this, therefore, was the
49. See comments in letter from Foreign Minister Abba Eban to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Measures Taken
by Israel to Change the Status of the City of Jerusalem, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess.,
Supp. for July-Sept. 1967, at 73, U.N. Doc. S/8052 (1967). In relating to General
Assembly Resolution 2253(ES-V), Eban writes the following: "'e term annexation
used by the supporters of the resolution is out of place." Id. The Foreign Minister
further clarifies the point that the measures adopted by Israel relate exclusively to
the unification of Jerusalem "in the administrative and municipal sphere" and
provide a basis for the protection of the Holy Places of Jerusalem. Id. Commenta-
tors regarded Eban's statement as "a refusal to admit an unwelcome legal charac-
terization of the measures taken in 1967 on the international plane and qualify it
as rhetoric in Israel's defence, making distinctions which were merely semantic."
Peter Malanczuk, Jerusalem, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 2, at 184, 189.
50. 49 D.X. 2420 (1967). Justice Cohn presents an interesting argument for
the Knesset's decision to resort to special legislation in order to apply the law,
jurisdiction and administration of the state of Israel to East Jerusalem, and in
order to adjoin it to the territory of Israeli Jerusalem. According to Cohn:
If the Legislator felt that there was a need for a new piece of legislation,
it could only have been because the proclamation of the Minister of De-
fence with regard to the occupation of the territory by the Israeli Defence
Force was no longer appropriate for Jerusalem; the legal result attained
by the proclamation of the Minister of Defence should really be attained
by an Order issued by the Government; the legislation passed by the
Temporary Council of State with regard to the territories occupied by the
Israeli Defence Force, should really be passed again by the Knesset in
legislation relating to the areas of Eretz which are in our control, even if
not under the direct control of the Israeli Army.
Both the proclamation of the Minister of Defence according to the
Ordinance of 1948 and the order of the Government according to the
Law enacted in 1967, are Acts of State par excellence, and as such re-
quire prior consideration as well as a political decision. Both of the ac-
tions were intended to convert the areas to which they related into part
of the area of the State of Israel.
Cohn, supra note 31, at 248.
It has moreover been suggested that by transferring the power to issue
such an order from the Minister of Defense to the Government in its entirety, the
Knesset was attempting to emphasize that the Government action in the issuing
of the order "was not necessarily based exclusively upon the rights of the State as
a conquering State." This, on the face of it, would have been the meaning of the
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assumption of the Knesset in passing the stated section.
It is therefore not surprising that experts in international
law interpreted the law as not bringing about the annexation
of East Jerusalem to Israel, and indeed as having been enacted
without any intention on the part of the Knesset to do so.5
Experts in constitutional law, however, offered an opposing
opinion.52 Consequently, it was almost natural that while the
leaders of the state were making it clear both within and with-
out the Knesset that East Jerusalem had been annexed to
Israel,5' 3 the representatives of the state in international fo-
rums fervently denied that this was the result.54 Despite the
denials to the international community, the official position of
the Israeli government regarding the status of East Jerusalem
was made clear by Prime Minsiter Menachem Begin in a letter
accompanying the Camp David accords: "On the basis of [sec-
tion lB of the Law and Administration Ordinance], the gov-
ernment of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one
city, indivisible, the capital of the state of Israel."55
Any possible dispute was ultimately overtaken by events
with the passage of the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of
Israel." For this law specifically and expressly effected the
inclusion of "Jerusalem, complete and united" within Israeli
borders. 7 From now on, there can no longer be any argument
regarding the "sovereignty of the state of Israel" over the unit-
ed city of Jerusalem, and regarding Jerusalem's constituting
"part of the territory of the state of Israel.""8
use of such power by the Minister of Defense, whose action could have been inter-
preted as being "in the name of the High Command of the Conquering Army,
which is not based upon other rights - natural, historical or political." HOLTZMAN,
supra note 47, at 29.
51. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 38.
53. See supra text accompanying note 22 (statement of the Minister of Jus-
tice).
54. See Report of the Secretary-General on Measures Taken by Israel to Change
the Status of the City of Jerusalem, supra note 49; see also Malanczuk, supra note
49.
55. DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1978, at 10.
56. 1979-1980 S.H. 186, translated in 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979-1980). For the reac-
tion of the UN to the passing of the Basic Law, see G.A. Res. 35/169, U.N.
GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980); S.C. Res. 478,
U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2245th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. SIINF/36 (1980).
57. Compare § 1 of the Basic Law, 1979-1980 S.H. 186, translated in 34 L.S.I.
209 (1980) with COHEN, supra note 2, at 42.
58. Temple Mount Faithful v. Attorney General, No. 4185/90 (1990) (Isr.) (un-
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Returning to the question of the Golan Heights, the fact
that Israeli representatives in international forums empha-
sized that the status of all territories occupied in the Six Day
War was open for negotiation would seem to indicate that
there was no intention to annex them to Israel.59 However, it
is questionable whether this is the correct interpretation of
those statements. First, such statements are based upon politi-
cal, as opposed to legal, considerations. Second, there is noth-
ing to prevent the agreed transfer of territory under the sover-
eignty of one state to its neighbor. The point was clarified by
Prime Minister Menachem Begin in his response during the
second and third readings of the Golan Heights Law.6" The
Prime Minister was addressing the reservation to the law ex-
pressed by M.K. Amnon Rubinstein."' In his reservation,
Rubinstein called for the inclusion of a specific provision in the
law, clearly stating that "[niothing in this law shall prevent
Israel from engaging in peace negotiations with Syria, when it
expresses its willingness to recognize Israel and to live with it
in peace."62 Begin proposed that the reservation be rejected,
emphasizing that "this is a political matter" which does not be-
long in the wording of the law. The Prime Minister further
elaborated, stating:
Politically speaking I declare before all of the members of
government seated here, that the moment the President of
Syria states that he is prepared to engage in negotiations
with Israel for a peace treaty, at that moment the negotia-
tions for a peace treaty with Israel shall begin, and nothing
shall stand in our way.6"
This position was not limited to the Golan Heights. Simi-
lar statements were made by the Prime Minister in relation to
the Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel,' as being "mat-
published).
59. This point has been considered in the comments of some of the writers as
proof of the fact that Israel did not intend to annex the area of East Jerusalem.
See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 51.
60. 92 D.K. 784 (1981-1982).
61. 93 D.K. 1694 (1982).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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ters that are obvious."65
B. The Analogy to the Golan Heights: A Response to Professor
Sheleff
Professor Sheleff claims that the status of the Golan
Heights is different from that of Jerusalem, and provides sev-
eral reasons. "First, the application of the law in East Jeru-
salem was effected by an administrative act and not by an act
of direct legislation, as was the case with the Golan
Heights."66 I find this argument hard to accept. Does the
legislature's failure to empower the government or one of its
ministers with the authority to implement the law, deciding in-
stead to implement it itself, derogate in any way the validity of
the act? And, if the government can act on the basis of the
empowerment of the Knesset, cannot the Knesset perform the
same act directly? I would have thought precisely the opposite:
the very fact that the legislature itself openly and explicitly
applied Israeli law to the Golan Heights is a very clear indica-
tion of the legislature's intention. 7
Second, Professor Sheleff maintains that the rule for the
Golan Heights differs from that of East Jerusalem, since the
latter was a part of the territory of Palestine, and was illegally
annexed to the territory of Trans-Jordan, whereas the Golan
Heights were outside its borders.68 Admittedly, it is this his-
torical difference between the territories that prevented Israel
from exercising section liB-the applicability of which is re-
stricted to the "territory of the Land of Israel,"69 and forced it
to pass a special law. Even so, this distinction does not war-
rant the conclusion that Sheleff seeks to derive from it.
In presenting the proposal to add section lB to the Law
65. Id.
66. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 342.
67. In a similar vein, the Minister of Justice emphasized that there can be no
doubt that whatever the Minister of Defense is empowered to do by virtue of his
authority according to the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance, the govern-
ment can also do by virtue of § llB of the Law and Administration Ordinance. 49
D.K. 2427 (1967).
68. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 342.
69. For the same reason it was not possible to resort to the Area of Jurisdic-
tion and Powers Ordinance. Cf Labis v. Minister of Defence, 2 P.D. 153, 162
(1948) (Isr.), translated in 16 I.L.R. 96. The relevant passage was omitted from the
translator's report. See also Blau v. Israel, 22 P.M. 37 (Isr. Crim. Ct., Haifa 1958).
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and Administration Ordinance, the Minister of Justice empha-
sized that "the legal conception guiding the state of Israel
was... that the law would apply to the parts of Palestine
currently subject to the sovereignty of the state."7 ° However,
this fact per se did not bring about the application of the law
in these territories. In order to obtain that result, in the words
of the Minister of Justice, "a clear act of state sovereignty" was
required." This requirement receives its concrete expression
in the Government's designation by order of any of these terri-
tories as areas to which Israeli law applies in exactly the same
manner as was necessary to attain the same result in the
Golan Heights. In fact, the words of the Minister of Justice
were really only apologetic, intended to facilitate the presenta-
tion of the annexation in the international arena. By the same
token, his comments were also intended to appease those who
felt that this normative step constituted a negation of the view
that the territories of Judah and Samaria had been liberated
from the illegal Jordanian occupation and granted, ex post
facto, the status of territories "occupied" by Israel." As was
the case with the amendment of section liB, it was clear to
70. 49 D.K. 2420 (1967).
71. See supra note 22. Similarly, the occupation of any particular area by the
I.D.F did not, per se, convert the territory into one in which the Law of the State
of Israel applied, purely by virtue of the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordi-
nance. An essential condition was that in addition to the actual occupation, the
territory was to be defined by the Minister of Defense, in a proclamation, as being
under occupation by the I.D.F. Compare Lahis, 2 P.D. at 153 with Cohn, supra
note 31, at 249:
This is not to say that any area of the areas of the state of Israel, occu-
pied by the Israel Defence Forces, becomes part of the area of the state
purely by virtue of the act of occupation; both the proclamation of the
Minister of Defence according to the order issued in 1948 and the order
of the government according to the law passed in 1967 are both acts of
state par excellence and as such require consideration and a political
decision ....
72. As a result of which in presenting the draft bill, the Minister of Justice
prefaced his comments with the determination that "[tihe Israeli Defense Forces
liberated parts of the Land of Israel from the yolk of foreigners." 49 D.K. 2420
(1967). One commentator intended to provide a basis for this claim, as well as for
the claim that as a result, there is no place for the use of the term "annexation"
with regard to the application of Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to
East Jerusalem. See Blum, supra note 28, at 316-18. Another commentator notes
that some authors regard the annexation of East Jerusalem to have taken place
"when Israel designated Jerusalem as her capital after 1948." See Malanczuk,
supra note 49, at 189.
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the members of the Knesset that the Golan Heights Law was
intended to annex the Golan to Israel. When presenting the
draft bill, the Prime Minister said:
For many generations the Golan Heights were an integral
part of the Land. It was therefore clear that the northern
border of the Land of Israel ... would pass through the
Golan Heights. I can determine that historically speaking the
Golan Heights were and will be an integral part of the state
of Israel."
This recognition of the significance of the Golan Heights
Law was common to both the supporters of the law and its
detractors. 4 Yet it would seem that the most convincing and
73. 92 D.X. 764 (1981-1982); see Eliav Shochtman, Israel's Right to the Golan
Heights, 396 MiDsTREAM 15-16 (1993) (regarding the historical connection between
the Israeli people and the Golan Heights, and the political connection between the
Heights and Palestine) [hereinafter]; Eliav Shochtman, The Legal Status of Israel
in the Golan Heights, 6 NATIv No.6, 5 (1993).
74. See, e.g., the remarks of M.K. Amnon Rubinstein, 92 D.K. 852 (1981-1982)
("Only a week ago the Knesset, one bright morning, in a state of shock adopted
the decision of the Prime Minister to annex the Golan Heights in three reckless,
senseless readings."); cf. the comments of M.K. Meir Wilner, 93 D.K. 1698 (1982)
(commenting on "the Knesset's decision of 14 December 1981 to annex the Syrian
Golan Heights to Israel").
Sheleff emphasizes the fact that the Knesset rejected a proposal by one of
its members to change the title of the Golan Heights Law into "The Law for the
Annexation of the Golan Heights." Sheleff, supra note 1, at 336-37 n.11. Based on
this Sheleff states that the omission of the term "annexation" was not done "mere-
ly because of some oversight." Sheleff, supra note 1, at 336-37 n.11. I agree with
Sheleff that the Knesset intentionally avoided referring to the unequivocal term
"annexation." The Knesset did so, at the government's urging, in order to minimize
international reaction to the passage of the law.
The reasoning forwarded by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs and De-
fence Committee of the Knesset in rejecting the proposal is more problematic.
M.K. Moshe Arens stated that the proposal was "not compatible with the spirit
nor with the content of the law." 92 D.K. 784 (1981-1982). Yet, as Sheleff correctly
states, the proposal was made with the sole intention "to embarrass" the govern-
ment. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 337 n.11. It was that embarrassment in the inter-
national arena that Mr. Arens attempted to avoid. Arens was speaking with an
eye to the international community, in the same way that Israeli politicians spoke
with two voices when referring to the annexation of both East Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights. Arens, however, made his position clear on the implication of the
Golan Heights Law: "[Tihe day on which the draft bill is presented is a day of
celebration for [Israel]. We have long awaited this day." 92 D.K. 765 (1981-1982).
Arens added that "the security of the entire state depends on the continuation of
Israeli control over the Golan Heights." Id. Arens also expressed his confidence
that only a very few of the members of the Knesset "might foresee a possibility
that one day an area of such importance to the security of the state will be re-
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decisive of Sheleffs claims is based upon the wording of the
Basic Law: Jerusalem: the Capital of Israel, stating that "Jeru-
salem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel."75 Accord-
ing to Sheleff, "it was this legislation that probably altered
[East] Jerusalem's internal status with regard to the Israeli
legal system.""6
I cannot accept this claim. For the Basic Law to have the
meaning attributed to it by Sheleff, he must first prove that
prior to its passage East Jerusalem was not a part of Israel,
and with all due respect, he has not sustained the burden of
proof. Prime Minister Begin's statement that "Jerusalem is one
city, indivisible, the capital of Israel" was based on the 1967
enactments and preceded the Basic Law by two years." All
the court opinions quoted above" recognizing the annexation
of East Jerusalem were also handed down prior to the passage
of the Basic Law. This was also the position adopted in the
legal literature.79 From that point of view the law had no
turned to the Arab state which is perhaps the most persistent of all in fighting
against the state of Israel, and in in its objection to the existence of Israel in any
borders." Id.
Finally, Arens stated that the Golan Heights Law would unequivocally clari-
fy to all inhabitants of the Golan 'what is the future of the area, and as a result,
what is their future." Id.
Sheleff argues further that the hastiness with which the Golan Heights Law
was passed in the Knesset leads to the conclusion that it did not bring about a
change in the status of the territory. Sheleff, supra note 1 at 334. I fail to see the
logic behind the inference. If anything, I would have thought the contrary; given
the secrecy in which the draft bill had been prepared and rushed through the
Knesset, one could hardly regard it as having been targeted at the innocent goal
of furnishing the Golan Heights with a legal system. If such secrecy were needed
to further military and diplomatic preparation for reactions to the law, the flurry
of activity would point to an operation of some magnitude, such as annexation.
75. 1979-1980 S.H. 186, translated in 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979-1980).
76. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 344. Sheleff attributes major significance to the
fact that the declaration concerning East Jerusalem was made via a Basic Law
while the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights was made through ordi-
nary legislation. Sheleff maintains that the impact of a Basic Law is different
from that of an ordinary law, and it is only the former that may introduce a
change in the legal status of the territory. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 333 n.4, and
accompanying text. I disagree with Sheleffs position because the Supreme Court
has ruled that there is no special status conferred on a Basic Law which would
lead to a different outcome than the application of an ordinary law. Shtanger v.
Israel [35] 4 P.D. 673, 680 (1980) (Isr.).
77. See supra note 55.
78. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
79. See AINON RUBINSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRA-
EL 66-68 (3d ed. 1980). This book was one of the proof texts for Dr. Hofnung in
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practical significance, since, in the words of Rubinstein, "It was
a law affirming something that was already affirmed.""0 The
law's significance was essentially declarative, 81 and as such,
the political damage incurred may have outweighed its advan-
tages.82 Consequently, Sheleff's contention that only the
"passing [of] a Basic Law: The Golan Heights that would ex-
plicitly establish the status of the Golan Heights as part of
Israel," 3 is not convincing. And, if further proof is required,
Sheleff himself states that the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capi-
tal of Israel, "indisputably made East Jerusalem a part of
Israel, at least as far as Israeli law is concerned. "" In other
words, the law did not bring about a change in the status of
East Jerusalem, but rather made the status indisputable; the
change had already been effected by virtue of section lB of
the Law and Administration Ordinance.
An additional distinction made by Sheleff in relation to the
Golan Heights as opposed to East Jerusalem, is that unlike the
situation in the West Bank where the governmental and judi-
cial framework did not collapse as a result of the Israeli con-
quest, the I.D.F. forces reaching the Golan found themselves in
a crisis situation when they realized that "Syrian law had
ceased to be an effective legal instrument."85 It was for this
his comments. See also RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38; AMNON RUBINSTEIN, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 49 (1st ed. 1969); AMNON RUBINSTEIN,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 65-66 (2d ed. 1974); Maoz,
supra note 38. Similarly, the as yet unpublished decision in The Temple Mount
Faithful v. Attorney General relied upon the rulings that had predated the Basic
Law-Jerusalem the Capital of Israel. Temple Mount Faithful v. Attorney General,
No. 4185/90 (1990) (Isr.) (unpublished).
80. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 86; cf. 89 D.K. 4045 (1980) (statement of
M.K. Yehuda Ben-Meir) ("The law does not introduce any change, it rather affirms
the existing situation."). As a matter of fact, the jurists maintaining that East
Jerusalem was annexed to Israel adopt the same opinion regarding the Golan
Heights. Compare RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 86 with COHEN, supra note 2, at
42-43 and KLEIN, supra note 38.
81. Compare to the words of Justice Cohn, who stated the following: "The
Basic Law does not bring about any normative changes; all of the signs indicate
that its purpose was purely declaratory." COHN, supra note 31, at 246.
82. Many of the members of the Knesset expressed themselves in this manner
during the debate regarding the Basic Law proposal, even though they could not
but vote for it. See, e.g., 89 D.K. 4042, 4049-50 (1979-1980) (comments of M.K.
Zalmon Shuval and the remarks of M.K. Amnon Rubinstein).
83. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 333-34.
84. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 334.
85. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 338. For a description of the situation in the
Golan, see Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military
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reason that it became necessary to apply Israeli law to the
Heights, or, in Sheleffs terminology, to affirm the situation
that already existed, even though the particular measure
lacked any political significance. 6
This argument is also not convincing. Even if we accept
the author's assumption regarding the urgent need to apply
Israeli law in the Heights, there was no need to adopt such a
measure by way of legislation in the Knesset. The laws of war
authorize military commanders to enact laws in occupied terri-
tories when the need arises. 7 Legislation of this kind, accord-
ing to the strictures dictated by international law, lacks any
element of sovereignty by the occupying state. But this is not
the case when the occupying state unilaterally applies its law
to the occupied territory. Similarly, international law permits
the occupying power to appoint its own judges to preside in the
local courts when necessary; it further permits structural ad-
justments of the existing judicial system to the system familiar
to the judges appointed by the occupying state. Nonetheless,
these courts continue to be regarded as local courts and not as
courts of the occupying power.'
Needless to say, the Golan Heights Law does not comply
with these strictures. This in fact was the purport of the words
of Justice Kahan in the Ravidi case:89 "on the face of it, noth-
ing prevents the application of Israeli law to a particular terri-
tory, without having any intention to annex the territory to the
state of Israel."90 The Justice further elaborates: "Were the
military government to declare by virtue of its powers that
Israeli law shall apply to the Gaza Region or to the occupied
Government - The Initial Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 13, 55 (Meir Shamgar,
ed., 1982).
86. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 337.
87. See Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex to Hague Convention, 1899 (No. 11), 1907 (No. IV), Article 43; Tabib v. De-
fense Minister, 36 P.D. 622, 629-32, (1981) (Isr.), translated and abridged in 13
I.Y.H.R. 364 (1983); Yoram Dinstein, Legislative Power in Occupied Territories, 2
IYUNEI MISHPAT 505 (1972); Amnon Rubinstein, Israel and the Territories: The
Jurisdiction of the Courts, 14 IYUNEI MIsHPAT 415 (1989); E.H. Schwenk, Legisla-
tive Power under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393 (1945).
88. See YORAm DINSTEIN, THE LAW OF WAR 218-19 (1983).
89. Ravidi v. The Military Court, Hebron Zone, [24] 2 P.D. 419, 424 (1969)
(Isr.).
90. Id.
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territory of Sinai, there would be no room for doubt as to
whether the application of the law was tantamount to its an-
nexation to the state, but such an application of the law cannot
be compared to the act of legislation under discussion."91
III. CITIZENSHIP AND THE OBLIGATION OF MILITARY SERVICE
Sheleff argues that two Israeli government policies offer
decisive proof that the Golan Heights was not annexed to Isra-
el, and that "the Israeli legal and administrative system does
not generally relate to the Golan as if it was really a part of
Israel."92 The policies to which he refers are the fact that Isra-
el did not "automatically" grant citizenship to the Druze resi-
dents of the Heights, and the fact that Israel does not enlist
them for military service, an obligation otherwise applying to
all of the permanent residents of the state."
I am unable to see the link between the obligation of mili-
tary service and the question of annexation. The fact is that
even the Arab residents of Israel within the 1967 borders, who
constitute one fifth of the population, are not subject to this
obligation.9" Nor were the members of the Circasian commu-
nity enlisted for military service until many years after the es-
tablishment of the state.95 Can this fact be of any relevance
with regard to the determination of the territory of the state?
Moreover, there is a broad consensus that the decision to ex-
empt the Arab residents from the obligation of military service
for the duration of the state of war between Israel and the
Arab states, is indeed a "decision both correct and just."96 Nor
does Sheleff disagree with it. Even so, he maintains that the
Druze are not to be equated with the Arabs, for "it is also well
known that one of the characteristic features of this communi-
ty is that their loyalty is invariably given to the state in which
they are a resident."97
The very least that one can say about this claim is that it
91. Id.; cf. Malanczuk, supra note 2, at 288-93.
92. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 338.
93. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 346 n.50.
94. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 98
(1987); RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 314.
95. See ORI STENDEL, THE MINORITIES IN ISRAEL 29 (1973).
96. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 314.
97. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 346 n.50.
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obviously does not reflect the view of those charged with the
enlistment of minorities into the Army. Army authorities un-
derstood that the border separating the Golan Heights from
Syrian territory divides members of families related to each
other in the first degree. It may even have occurred to them
that the residents of the Golan view themselves as owing alle-
giance to Syria, as opposed to the Druze in Israel, who have
bound their fates to that of the state since its earliest days.
Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the final fate of the
Golan Heights that has continued since its occupation by Israel
causes its residents to hesitate in expressing loyalty of any
kind to "the state in which they reside."98
Indeed, it would appear that the military authorities are
correct, and it is doubtful whether Sheleffs description of the
residents of the Golan reflects their own self perception. In a
statement issued on February 31, 1982, Druze residents of the
Golan Heights made the following declaration: "We demand
that our national sentiments be respected by applying Israeli
civil law neither to us, nor to the land, nor to the nation, and
that we be related to as Syrian citizens living on their lands
under the Israeli occupation since 1967.""9
Finally, even if the military authorities are mistaken in
their approach, and the truth lies with Sheleff, how is it rele-
vant to the question of annexation? Several years ago, a Druze
citizen of Israel petitioned against his enlistment into the ar-
my, claiming that being a member of a minority community he
could not be forcibly enlisted. The answer of the High Court
was short and succinct: "It is not for us to investigate and
decide what motivated the authorities not to apply the law
until today to any particular group of people."' 0
On the face of it, the failure to grant automatic citizenship
to the residents of the Golan Heights is more disturbing. Pro-
fessor Dinstein raised the point in an analogous context, ques-
tioning whether the intention of the Knesset was to annex
98. See 91 D.K. 2230 (1981-1982) (remarks of M.K. Shafik Asad).
99. The text of the statement was produced by M.K. Meir Wilner, in a pro-
posal for the daily agenda, relating to "the current situation in the Golan
Heights." 93 D.K. 1698 (1981-1982); see also 91 D.K. 2231-32 (1981-1982) (remarks
of M.K. Tufik Tubi).
100. Hassuna v. Prime Minister, 10 P.D. 710 (1956) (Isr.). See also Yoran
Shachar, The Elgazi Trials-Selective Conscientious Objection in Israel, 12 I.Y.H.R.
214, 221 n.26 (1982).
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East Jerusalem to Israel.'' He also pointed out that when a
state acquires territory, whether by virtue of its creation,
transfer or annexation, "citizenship is generally speaking auto-
matically granted to all of the residents permanently residing
there."' 2 Sheleff is thus correct in his assumption that there
is a defect in the annexation of territory without the automatic
granting of citizenship to the residents therein, and that "[t]his
is especially true with regard to democracies." 1°3
However, this defect does not derogate the act of annex-
ation. The result of such a situation is only that "it allows the
application of Israeli law in new territories, without ensuring
that the residents of those territories are guaranteed equal
rights with respect to their status as citizens."0 4 Just as this
defect does not derogate the applicability of Israeli law to those
territories, similarly it does not affect the fact of the annex-
ation of those territories. We would have come to the same
conclusion even had we accepted Sheleffs assumptions in their
entirety. In his opinion, with the acceptance of the Basic Law:
Jerusalem: the Capital of Israel, the internal law of Israel, ef-
fected an act of annexation.' 5 The status of Jerusalem after
the passing of the Basic Law is essentially not different to that
of the Golan Heights. In both of them the percentage of origi-
nal local residents who have been granted Israeli citizenship is
negligible. Furthermore, Dinstein notes that "to the extent that
the issue is one of acquisition according to an international
agreement of a part of a state (that continues to exist), it is
customary to grant an option to the residents of the piece of
territory changing hands-to either accept the new citizenship,
or to reject it and retain the old citizenship."'
The considerations of Israel with regard to the granting of
citizenship to the residents of the Golan Heights were moti-
vated by politics and security. The Knesset had addressed the
problem of the residents of the Golan Heights prior to the
passing of the Golan Heights Law. In the Nationality Law
101. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 42 (quoting Yoram Dinstein, Lecture at the
Institute for Jerusalem Studies (June 14, 1979)).
102. YORA1 DINSTEIN, THE INTERNAL POWERS OF THE STATE 27 (1971).
103. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 344 n.43.
104. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 691.
105. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 341-44.
106. Dinstein, supra note 87.
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(Amendment No. 4), 5740-1980,07 the Knesset added section
6(e) to the Nationality Law, 5712-1952.'0s The section em-
powers the Minister of the Interior to grant citizenship "to a
resident of full age of a zone occupied by the Defense Army of
Israel," while waiving the requirements for naturalization. 9
One of the prerequisites for the section's implementation is
that the Minister is convinced "that the applicant identifies
with the state of Israel and its objectives and he or a member
of his family has performed a significant act to further the
security or economy or some other important interest of the
state, or that the grant of citizenship as aforesaid is of especial
interest to the state."10 Although the law refers in general
terms to "a zone occupied by the Defense Army of Israel," it
was clear during the vote on the amendment that it was specif-
ically designated for the Golan Heights.' Thus, instead of
granting automatic citizenship to all of the residents of the
Heights, the legislature chose to limit it to those residents who
were loyal to the state. Furthermore, if complaints had been
raised against Israel concerning the granting of citizenship to
the residents of the Heights, they would not have been the
result of citizenship withheld from the residents but rather of
citizenship forced upon them."2
Summing up, the arguments raised by Sheleff to the effect
that the Golan Heights has not been annexed are unconvinc-
ing. In contrast, the approach adopted by the Knesset seems to
lead to the opposite conclusion; the Golan Heights was indeed
annexed to Israel.
107. 1979-1980 S.H. 222, translated in 34 L.S.I. 254 (1979-1980).
108. 1951-1952 S.H. 146, translated in 6 L.S.I. 50 (1951-1952).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See the remarks of M.K Meir Wilner, who regarded the amendment as "a
step towards annexation." 89 D.I 4200 (1979-1980). M.K. Moshe Amar suggested
omitting the words "a zone occupied by the Defense Army of Israel," in order to
prevent the intention of the enactment from being "clear to the world," and thus
liable "to provoke thoughts as to the intention in applying the Nationality Law,
which is a fundamental law." Id. at 4199. The reservation of M.K. Moshe Amar
was echoed by other Knesset members, amongst them the Minister of the Interior.
The Chairman of the Internal Affairs and Environment Committee, M.K. Shlomo
Hillel chose not th relate explicitly to this reservation, being content to call upon
the Knesset members "in this matter, to rely on the discretion of the committee."
Id. at 4205.
112. See The Druze Residents of the Golan Heights, 91 D.K. 2230-32 (1981-
1982) (proposal for the daily agenda of the Knesset).
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IV. THE KNESSET POSITION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW
In the cases of several statutes, the Knesset has revealed
its position that as a result of the enactment of the Golan
Heights Law, the status of the Golan was transformed from a
territory held under belligerent occupation into a part of Israel.
This section will briefly discuss two of these legislative
acts."3
In the first case, the Minister of Defense, immediately
after the Six Day War, enacted emergency regulations intend-
ed to grant jurisdiction to the Israeli courts over persons in
Israel who had committed an offense in the "zone," as well as
to grant similar jurisdiction to the Israeli Police Force and to
the Attorney General. "Zone" was defined as including "the
Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza region and Southern
Sinai.""4 The regulations were extended yearly by the
Knesset, and the definition of "zone" went through numerous
revisions from 1967 through 1981, though each version re-
tained jurisdiction over the Golan Heights."'
113. For a detailed description of additional legislation relating to the Occupied
Territories, see RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 104-07; Amnon Rubinstein, The
Changing Status of the Territories: From Trust Deposit to Legal Hybrid, 11 IYuNEI
MISHPAT 439, 447-50 (1985-1986); see also supra note 79.
114. Emergency Regulations (Offences in the Occupied Territories - Jurisdiction
and Legal Assistance), 5727-1967, 1966-1967 K.T. 2420. The Law and Administra-
tion Ordinance, 5708-1948, (§ 9), 1948 I.R. 1 (Supp. 1), empowers the government
to enact emergency regulations to regulate urgent matters of national interest.
This authority exists for as long as the Knesset declares that "a state of emergen-
cy exists in the State." Such declaration was made on May 21, 1948, following the
establishment of the Israeli state and the Arab attack on it (see 1948 I.R. 6) and
has not been revoked since. Emergency regulations may alter, suspend or modify
any law. Yet the regulations will expire after three months unless extended by a
law of the Knesset.
115. In the Emergency Regulations (Offences in the Occupied Territories - Ju-
risdiction and Legal Assistance) (Extension of Validity) Law, 5728-1967, 1967-1968
S.H. 20, translated in 22 L.S.I. 20 (1967-1968), the definition of the term "zone"
was changed to include "any of the areas held by the Defense Army of Israel."
In the 1977 extension law, the title of the emergency regulations was
changed to: Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Golan
Heights, Sinai and Southern Sinai-Criminal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance)
(Extension of Validity) Law, 5738-1977, 1977-1978 S.H. 48, translated in 32 L.S.I.
58 (1977-1978). The definition of the term "zone" was changed accordingly.
After several additional extension laws, an amendment bill was proposed in
1981 for the amendment and the extension of the Emergency Regulations (Judea
and Samaria, The Gaza Region, The Golan Heights, Sinai and Southern Sinai -
Criminal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance), 5742-1981, 1981-1982 HATzA'OT HOK
[H.H.] 4.
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During the first reading of the 1981 extension law draft,
M.K. Abraham Katz-Oz demanded that the Golan Heights be
removed from the language of the amendment.'16 His reason-
ing was that the Knesset "must act as soon as possible to apply
Israeli law to the Golan Heights,""7 through formal legisla-
tion passed by the Knesset, rather than through regulations
issued by the Minister of Defense. Responding to the demand,
the Minister of Justice noted that "the matter of the applica-
tion of Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan
Heights is a matter of timing ... the government shall deter-
mine the right time.""' He rejected Katz-Oz's request, the
meaning of which was, in his words, "the immediate applica-
tion of Israeli sovereignty, law, jurisdiction and administration
to the Golan Heights."'
Nevertheless, "the Golan Heights" was ultimately deleted
from the 1981 amendment to the regulation because the second
and third readings of the draft were presented after the pass-
ing of the Golan Heights Law,' making specific mention of
the Golan Heights unnecessary.'
21
It is illustrative that in a 1984 revision of the regula-
tion,22 the words "Sinai and Southern Sinai" were also delet-
ed from both the title of the regulations and the definition of
"zone."23 The explanatory note to the draft regulation1 24
specified that the omission was "the result of the return of the
116. 92 D.K. 397 (1981-1982).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 414-15.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 877; see also id. at 875 (comments of the Chairman of the Constitu-
tion, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset).
121. Thus, in the final version of the draft regulation originally entitled Emer-
gency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Golan Heights, Sinai and
Southern Sinai - Criminal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) (Amendment and
Extension of Validity) Law, 5742-1981, 1981-1982 S.H. 18, translated in 36 L.S.I.
16 (1981-1982), the words "the Golan Heights" were deleted from the title of the
regulations and from the definition of the term "zone." Id. at 877. This provision
was given retroactive validity, as of December 14, 1981, which was the date that
the Golan Heights Law came into force.
122. Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Golan Heights,
Sinai and Southern Sinai - Criminal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance)
(Amendment and Extension of Validity) Law, 5744-1984, 1983-1984 S.H. 36,
translated in 38 L.S.I. 43 (1983-1984).
123. Id.
124. 1983-1984 H.H. 117.
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Sinai and Southern Sinai to Egypt in the wake of the imple-
mentation of the peace. agreement."'25
There are therefore two reasons, in essence identical, for
the removal of the two areas from the zone to which the regu-
lations apply, being "the areas held by the Defense Army of
Israel."'26 Thus, Sinai and Southern Sinai were removed be-
cause they had been returned to Egyptian sovereignty, and had
therefore been taken out of Israel's possession as an occupying
power. For exactly the same reason-having been transferred
into formal Israeli sovereignty, and thus removed from the
possession of Israel as an occupying power-the Golan Heights
was also removed from the purview of the regulations.
The second legislative act demonstrating the Knesset's
intent in applying Israeli law to the Golan Heights is the In-
come Tax Ordinance [New Version].' The Ordinance impos-
es tax on "income of any person accruing in, derived from, or
received in Israel.""8 In the Income Tax Ordinance (Amend-
ment No. 32) Law, 5738-1978,"' the basis of chargeable in-
come of an Israeli national was expanded, and it was deter-
mined that it would include income that was accrued, produced
or received in a zone. "Zone" was defined as "any of the fol-
lowing: Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Region, the Golan
Heights, Sinai and Southern Sinai." In a 1990 amendment, 3
the words "Golan Heights, Sinai and Southern Sinai" were
omitted from the definition of the term "zone," for the very
same reasons that lead to their omission from the Regulations
for Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance discussed above.
V. THE POSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN RELATION TO THE
GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW
The relevant rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court are also
consistent with the conclusion that the Golan Heights was an-
nexed to Israel.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 115 (addressing the wording of the first Extension Law).
127. 6 DINEI MEDINAT YISRAEL (NUSACH CHADASH) 120 (1961), translated in 1
L.S.I. NEW VOLUME [N.V.] 145 (1967).
128. Id., translated in 1 L.S.I. N.V. at 146.
129. 1977-1978 S.H. 216, translated in 32 L.S.I. 277 (1977-1978).
130. Income Tax Ordinance (Amendment No. 81), 5750-1990, 1989-1990 S.H. 52.
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In Kang Abou Tzalach v. Minister of the Interior,13' a pe-
tition was filed by residents of the Golan Heights against a
regulation forcing them to carry identity cards.13 2 The peti-
tioners claimed that according to the language of the law, the
obligation to carry an identity card applies only to "a per-
son ... legally situated in Israel," and thus does not apply to
the Golan Heights. 3 They reasoned that "the Golan Heights
Law did not convert the Golan Heights into a part of Israel,
and thus a person legally situated in the Golan Heights is not
legally situated in Israel, and is consequently not subject to the
obligation of receiving, carrying and presenting an identity
card."3 4 In rejecting the petition Justice Aharon Barak deter-
mined that, "[buy virtue of the Golan Heights Law, all of the
legal norms applicable in the state were applicable to the
Golan Heights, so that any mention of the terms 'Israel,' 'the
state,' or 'the state of Israel' in the legislation also includes the
Golan Heights."1 5
Sheleff is correct in pointing out that "the High Court
preferred to leave the question [of annexation] as one requiring
further examination," 36 at least explicitly. Yet it would ap-
pear to me that the recognition of annexation is implied by the
ruling, and at all events derives from it.
In the Kang ruling, Justice Barak avoided going into the
"questions arising in the area of public international law" and
"questions of political science, with respect to the definition of
the state." His ruling was restricted to "the interpretative
question relating to the legal effect of the Golan Heights
Law."'37 Furthermore, in his ruling he endorsed the thesis
that "the application of a particular Israeli legal norm to a par-
ticular place outside the territory of the state, does not, ipso
facto convert that particular place into a part of Israel."'38 He
therefore rules that "everything is dependent upon the aim,
131. [37] 2 P.D. 718 (1982) (Isr.).
132. The identity cards were required by the Emergency Regulations (Posses-
sion and Presentation of Identity Certificate) (Extension of Validity) Law, 5731-
1971, 1970-1971 S.H. 109, translated in 25 L.S.I. 108 (1970-1971).
133. See Kang Abou Tzalach, [37] 2 P.D. at 720.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 351.
137. Kang Abou Tzalach, [37] 2 P.D. at 720.
138. Id.
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language, actions and effect of the norm being interpreted.""9
Justice Barak did not explain what the effect of the particular
norm under discussion was with respect to the Golan Heights
becoming a part of Israel. Even so, it seems to me that this
conclusion is consistent with the ruling in the matter of Kang,
and, with Barak's referral to the Ravidi decision 40 by which
the application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem brought about
its annexation to Israel. This would appear to be the reason-
able conclusion regarding the Golan Heights too, given that
Justice Barak expressly stated that "there can be no doubt that
both the intention of the legislation and the language of the
provision was to equate the Golan Heights with Israel itself, in
terms of law, jurisdiction and administration."' These words
echo Justice Barak's opinion in the Awad case' in which he
wrote:
[B]y proclaiming that East Jerusalem is an area of the Land
of Israel to which the law, jurisdiction and administration of
the state apply, the government created an integration of the
area and of its inhabitants into the system of the law, juris-
diction and administration of the state. East Jerusalem was
unified with West Jerusalem. This is the meaning of the
annexation of East Jerusalem to the state, and making it a
part thereof. With the application of the law, jurisdiction and
administration there was a synchronization between the law,
jurisdiction and administration of the state and East Jerusa-
lem and those dwelling there.'
This result is also consistent with the ruling that was
established in the matter of the Temple Mount Faithful v.
Attorney General.' In that case, the question discussed was
whether the laws of Israel apply to the area of the Temple
Mount. The Supreme Court ruled, in an opinion given by D.P.
Menachem Elon:
It is clear, and goes without saying, that as a result of the
sovereignty of the state of Israel over united Jerusalem gen-
139. Id.
140. See Ravidi v. Military Court, Hebron Zone, [24] 2 P.D. 419 (1969) (Isr.).
141. See Kang Abou Tzalach, [37] 2 P.D. at 721.
142. See Awad v. Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, [42] 2 P.D. 424
(1988) (Isr.) (Barak, J.).
143. Id. at 429.
144. No. 4185/90 (1990) (Isr.) (unpublished).
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erally and over the area of the Temple Mount specifically, all
of the laws of the state of Israel are applicable to the area of
the Temple Mount. 45
This is not merely a matter of semantics. Several enact-
ments confer on the state of Israel ownership interests in vari-
ous properties. Section 3 of the State Property Law, 5711-
1951,146 states: "Ownerless property situated in Israel is
property of the state of Israel as from the day of its becoming
ownerless ..... , " Since under the Kang ruling we are sup-
posed to read the words "Israel" and "state" as including the
Golan Heights, it follows that such property, located in the
Golan, becomes the property of the state of Israel. I submit
that the forcible acquisition of property, including land, situat-
ed in the Golan Heights, is a clear indication of Israeli sover-
eignty over the Heights."'
145. Id. at 39.
146. 1950-1951 S.H. 52, translated in 5 L.S.I. 45 (1950-1951).
147. Section 1 of the same law provides that "property" includes movables as
well as immovables. Id. Section 108 of the Land Law, 5729-1968, 1968-1969 S.H.
169, translated in 13 L.S.I. 173 (1968-1969) similarly provides that "property situ-
ated under waters of lakes in Israel belong to the state of Israel and are public
property." The Water Law, 5719-1959, 1958-1959 S.H. 169, translated in 13 L.S.I.
173 (1958-1959) provides that the water resources in the state are public property
subject to the control of the state. Another example is provided by the Sand Drift
Ordinance of 1922; 2 LAWS OF PALESTINE 1314 (1933). This Ordinance empowers
the Chief Forest Officer to demand a registered owner of land to cooperate in
stopping sand from drifting over farm land or in reclaiming such land covered by
sand drift. If such owner declines to cooperate in the work and his land is covered
by sand drift "any interest which he may have therein shall be extinguished and
shall vest in the Government." See also § 17 of the Succession Law, 5725-1963,
1963-1964 S.H. 63, translated in 19 L.S.I. 58 (1963-1964), which provides that
"[w]here there is not heir . . . the State shalt succeed as an intestacy."
148. This is obviously so with regard to the Golan Heights (Transitory Provi-
sions) (No. 3), 5742-1982, 1981-1982 K.T. 529. The provisions were enacted by the
Minister of the Interior, under the authority conferred upon him by the Golan
Heights Law. These regulations provide that any property in the Golan Heights,
which belonged to Syria, shall be submitted to the control of the Israel Lands
Administration. Id. The Israel Lands Administration Law, 5720-1960, 1959-1960
S.H. 57, translated in 14 L.S.I. 50 (1960) states that the Administration shall be
established "to administer Israel [sic] lands." Id. The law refers to the Basic Law:
Israel Lands, 1959-1960 S.H. 56, translated in 14 L.S.I. 48 (1960) for the interpre-
tation of "Israel [sic] lands" The Basic Law defines "Israel [sic] lands" as the
"lands in Israel of the state . .. ." Id. This definition clearly indicates that in the
opinion of the Minister of the Interior, by enacting the Golan Heights Law and
applying Israeli law to the Golan, the ownership of Syrian state lands was surren-
dered to Israel. As the opinion of the Minister of the Interior obviously reflects
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
VI. THE POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
REGARDING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW
The Arab states, headed by Syria, as well as other states
and international organizations, viewed the Golan Heights
Law as being designed to bring about the annexation of the
Heights to Israel. In a harshly worded statement issued by the
Syrian government after the passing of the law,49 a request
was made for an urgent convening of the Security Council in
order to adopt a decision nullifying the Israeli measures and
imposing sanctions upon Israel. In its statement the Syrian
government made it clear that "this Israeli decision means the
annexation of the occupied Syrian territories, a declaration of
war on Syria and the annulment of the ceasefire."
In its declaration the Syrian government stated that it
would spare no effort "to defend its territory and its national
interests."' o These declarations were reiterated by the chair-
man of the Syrian parliament during a session of parlia-
ment.'5' On the same day the Syrian representative to the
United Nations filed a request for an emergency session of the
Security Council to debate the "decision of the Israeli Govern-
ment to apply Israeli law to the Occupied Golan Heights."'52
The next day an additional statement was issued by the
Jordanian government, in which it condemned "Israel's deci-
sion to annex the occupied Arab Golan Heights."5 ' Jordan
defined the Golan Heights Law as a new measure "in its
government opinion, it is hard to imagine any clearer indication of annexation.
149. Statement Issued by the Syrian Government After the Israeli Decision to
Annex the Syrian Golan Heights (December 14, 1981), 11 J. PALESTINE STUD. 199
(1982) [hereinafter Statement Issued by the Syrian Government]. An interesting
argument to the effect that the Golan Heights Law was null and void was raised
in the Syrian application to the Inter-Parliamentary Association (IPU): "Because
the so called Israeli Parliament ... holds its meetings on land which does not
belong to it but is the property of Arab Jerusalem." IPU Asked To Expel Israel, in
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-MIDDLE EAST ASIA [FBIS-MEA]-81-243,
Dec. 18, 1981, at H-2.
150. Statement Issued by the Syrian Government, supra note 149.
151. Further Reaction to Israeli Decision on Golan, in FBIS-MEA-81-242, Dec.
17, 1981, at H1.
152. Letter from the Representative of the Syrian Republic to the President of
the Security Council (Dec. 14, 1981), U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec.
1981, at 60, U.N. Doc. S/14791 (1981).
153. Statement Issued by the Jordanian Government After the Israeli Decision
to Annex the Golan Heights (Dec. 15, 1981), 11 J. PALESTINE STUD. 200 (1982)
[hereinafter Statement Issued by the Jordanian government].
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[Israel's] aggressive and expansionist policy aimed at Judaizing
and annexing the occupied Arab territories."54 According to
the statement, these measures include "the usurpation of pre-
cious parts of Palestine in 1948, the occupation of other Arab
territories in 1967, the Judaization and annexation of Arab
Jerusalem, and the establishment of settlements."5 '
Egypt also condemned the annexation of the Golan by
Israel. The Egyptian representative to the United Nations con-
demned "this creeping annexation"' as resembling "the similar
measure taken by the Israeli government of illegally annexing
Arab Jerusalem."'56
Additional Arab states and other member states of the
Arab League joined in the condemnation of Israel for its an-
nexation of the Golan Heights.
57
154. Id.
155. Id; see also Government Issues Statement on Golan Heights, in FBIS-
MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at F1; Ad-Duster on Need for Joint Arab Action,
FBIS-MEA-81-243 (Dec. 18, 1981), at F1 (condemnation by the Jordanian Senate of
the Israeli Law annexing the Syrian Golan Heights).
156. U.N. Delegate's Reaction, in FBIS-MEA-81-242 (Dec. 17, 1981), at D4; see
also Mubarak Talks to Newsmen, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at D1 (reac-
tion of President Mubarak); Foreign Ministry Statement, FBIS-MEA-81-240 (Dec.
15, 1981), at D2; Reaction to Israeli Annexation of Golan Heights, FBIS-MEA-81-
241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at D1, 9 (reaction of the Egyptian Cabinet).
157. See President Confirms Solidarity with Syria, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16,
1981), at Q1 (reactions of the Lebanese Foreign Minister); Skaf Denounces Israeli
Decision on Golan, FBIS-MEA-81-243 (Dec. 18, 1981), at G5 (Lebanese Minister of
Defense); Israeli Decision on Golan Heights Denounced, FBIS-MEA-81-240 (Dec. 15,
1981), at C2 (Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Matters); Cabinet Discusses
Israeli Annexation of Golan, FBIS-MEA-81-242 (Dec. 22, 1981), at C6 (Council of
Ministers of Saudi Arabia, headed by Prince Fahd); People's Assembly Condemns
Golan Annexation, FBIS-MEA-81-243 (Dec. 18, 1981), at Q1 (President and Parlia-
ment of Algeria); Boucetta Condemns Israeli Annexation of Golan, FBIS-MEA-81-
241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at Q6 (Minister of State in Charge of Foreign Affairs of Mo-
rocco); FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at Q1 (Tunisian and Sudanese Foreign
Ministers); Communique Rejects, Condemns Golan Annexation, FBIS-MEA-81-242
(Dec. 17, 1981), at Q7 (Sudanese Foreign Ministry); Israeli Annexation of Golan
Heights Scored, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at C3 (Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs of Qatar); Foreign Ministry: Golan Annexation 'Invalid,' FBIS-MEA-
81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at C4 (Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates);
Official Statement Condemns Golan Annexation, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981),
at C5 (Foreign Ministries of the Democratic Popular Republic of Yemen); Govern-
ment Issues Statement on Golan Issue, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at C6
(Foreign Ministry of the Arab Republic of Yemen); Official Statement Condemns
Golan Annexation, FBIS-MEA-81-242 (Dec. 17, 1981), at C5 (spokesman for the
Foreign Ministry of Oman); Somalia Denounces Israeli Golan Decision, FBIS-MEA-
81-243 (Dec. 18, 1981), at R3 (Foreign Ministry of Somalia); Ministry Denounces
Israel, Urges Arab Solidarity, FBIS-MEA-81-242 (Dec. 17, 1981), at Q5 (Deputy
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Arab organizations and terrorist organizations also con-
demned the annexation. The Central Council of the PLO con-
vened in Damascus and condemned the decision that had been
adopted "by the Zionist enemy's Knesset" to annex the Golan,
emphasizing that "coming as it has after the decision to annex
Jerusalem, this decision is an embodiment of the Zionist
enemy's expansionist policy and the design on the Arab world
as a whole." 5 '
The foreign ministers of the European Community as well
expressed distress at "the decision of Israeli government and
Knesset to apply the law, jurisdiction and administration of
Israel to the occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights."
They perceived the application as being "tantamount to annex-
ation," as contradicting international law "and therefore [be-
ing] invalid in [their] eyes."'59
The United States also regarded the Golan Heights Law
as the annexation of the Heights to Israel, a fact that posed an
additional obstacle to peace in the region.6 '
In the aftermath of the Syrian complaint, the Security
Council convened and after reaffirming its prohibition against
the forcible acquisition of territory, it determined that the
Israeli decision to apply its law "in the occupied Syrian Golan
Heights" was null and void.'6' The Security Council denand-
ed that Israel immediately repeal its decision and requested
that the Secretary-General of the United Nations report to it
regarding the execution of the decision.'62
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mauritania); Government Con-
demns Golan Heights Annexation, FBIS-MEA-81-242 (Dec. 17, 1981), at R1 (For-
eign Ministry of Djibouti).
158. Statement Issued by the PLO Central Council at the End of Its Meeting
in Damascus (December 29, 1981), 11 J. PALESTINE STUD. 202 (1982); see also
PLO Issues Statement on Golan Annexation, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at
Al; The General Secretariat of the League of Islamic and Arab People, FBIS-MEA-
81-242 (Dec. 17, 1981), at Al; OIC Condemnation, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16,
1981), at Al (reactions of the OIC-Organization of Islamic Conference); Gulf Coun-
cil Official on Golan, Saudi Plan, FBIS-MEA-81-243 (Dec. 18, 1981), at C1 (GCC-
Gulf Cooperation Council); The General Secretary of the Popular Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine, FBIS-MEA-81-241 (Dec. 16, 1981), at D4.
159. Statement Issued by the EEC Foreign Ministers on the Extension of Isra-
el, in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 69 (No. 12 1981).
160. Reagan's Reaction to Golan Report, FBIS-MEA-81-243 (Dec. 18, 1981), at
1-10.
161. S.C. Res. 497, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2319th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.
SINF/37 (1981).
162. G.A. Res. 36/226A, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 47, U.N. Doc.
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On the same day a decision was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly'6 3 reaffirming its previous deci-
sions and those of the Security Council determining that
Israel's decision to annex Jerusalem and to make it its capital,
and its actions in changing the character, status and composi-
tion of the city were all null and void. It called upon Israel to
revoke these measures immediately.
In another section, the General Assembly severely con-
demned "Israeli annexation policies and practices in the occu-
pied Syrian Golan Heights" and the steps adopted there, in-
cluding the forced granting of citizenship to the Syrian subjects
living there. The Assembly determined that these steps were
null and void."
In an additional decision adopted on the same day65 the
General Assembly once again condemned "the persistence of
the Israeli policy of annexation" and demanded that it revoke
the decision to apply Israeli law to the Golan Heights, a deci-
sion that it once more defined as "null and void and without
any legal validity whatsoever." The General Assembly called
upon the Security Council to act according to Section 7 of the
UN Charter, should Israel fail to execute and comply with the
said request, and called upon the General Secretary to report
regarding the implementation of this decision.'66
The reports of the Secretary-General stated the Israeli
position, and described the circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of the Golan Heights Law. The reports also contained an
Israeli assurance that it desired to negotiate with Syria, as
with its other neighbors, without any preconditions, and to-
ward a lasting peace in accordance with resolutions 242 and
338 of the Security Council. Israel made it quite clear that "the
Golan Heights Law does not preclude or impair such negotia-
tions.' 67
A/36/51 (1981).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. G.A. Res. 36/226B, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/36/51 (1981).
166. Id.
167. Report of the Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-
Dec. 1981, at 73, U.N. Doc. S/14821 (1981); see also Report of the Secretary Gener-
al, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1981, at 64, U.N. Doc. S/14805
(1981) (incorporating U.N. Doc. S/14805/corr.1 (1981)).
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Following the report of the UN Secretary-General, the
Jordanian delegation presented a draft resolution for the Secu-
rity Council decision.'68 In its proposal Jordan maintained that
the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights since
June 1967, and its annexation by Israel on December 14th,
1981, constituted an ongoing threat to international peace and
security. The proposal determined that the Israeli decision to
apply its law to the occupied Syrian Golan Heights constituted
"an act of aggression" according to section 39 of the UN Char-
ter, and further called upon all of the member states to adopt
effective measures "in order to nullify the Israeli annexation of
the Syrian Golan Heights."
The proposal to impose sanctions on Israel in order to
coerce it into revoking the Golan Heights Law was vetoed by
the United States. As a result, the matter was raised for dis-
cussion in the General Assembly in an emergency session. In
its decision, the General Assembly harshly condemned Israel
for its failure to comply with the General Assembly's earlier
decision. Once again the General Assembly made clear that the
application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights, together with
the steps adopted for their implementation "are illegal and
invalid and shall not be recognized." The General Assembly
decision expressly refers to the "continued occupation of the
Syrian Golan Heights since 1967 and its effective annexation
by Israel on December 14, 1981, following Israel's decision to
apply its laws, jurisdiction, and administration on that territo-
ry."
169
It is thus clear that even though the Arab states and the
international community contested the legality of the Golan
Heights Law, they were united in the opinion that, like the
legislation on Jerusalem, the law was intended to annex the
Golan Heights to Israel ° The UN General Assembly even
recognized the "effective annexation," albeit illegal, of the
Golan Heights to Israel as a direct result of the law. And,
while it may be argued that the Arab states tended to exagger-
168. Jordan: Revised Draft Resolution, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., Supp. Jan.-Mar.
1982, U.N. Doc. S/14832fRev. 1 (1982).
169. U.N. GAOR ES-9/1, 9th Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/ES-9/7 (1982) (emphasis added).
170. Cf. Malanczuk, supra note 43, at 176; Malanczuk, supra note 2, at 265-69.
Malanczuk unequivocally states that "the Golan Heights Act is clearly an act of
annexation." Malanczuk, supra note 2, at 294.
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ate the significance of the Golan Heights Law for the sake of
reaping political capital, the declarations and decisions cannot
be overlooked. They unequivocally regarded the Golan Heights
Law as unilaterally annexing the Heights to Israel. Israel did
not revoke the law despite the international pressure, thus
lending force to the inference that was universally drawn from
the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights.
VII: THE GoLAN HEIGHTS LAW AND THE PEACE TALKS WITH
SYRIA
The dispute between Sheleff and myself regarding the
question of the annexation of the Golan cannot be considered
in isolation from the political events relating to its future. The
political dispute arose in the media when the peace talks be-
tween the Syrian and Israeli governments began, inevitably
centering on the fate of the Golan. Once the peace talks began,
a public controversy arose regarding the question of whether
the Israeli government had a mandate to conduct negotiations
with Syria, such negotiations involving possible concessions on
the status of the territories of the Golan Heights. The contro-
versy ended with the filing of a complaint to the police against
the Government and Prime Minister Rabin and against those
conducting the negotiations, as well as the filing of a petition
to the High Court of Justice against the same.'' These mea-
sures were grounded in the view that "the conduct of negotia-
tions by the executive authority ... with respect to the Golan
Heights, with the intention that any part of the territory of the
Heights is to be removed from Israeli sovereignty, is an act
performed without authorization, constituting an offence under
the Penal Law, 5737-1977,1"2 and the Golan Heights Law,
5742-1981."'1 3 The offenses attributed to the respondents
were the offenses specified in Chapter Seven, Article B of the
Penal Law, dealing with treason-the offence being the "im-
pairment of the sovereignty or integrity of the state"'74 and of
171. Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount and the Land of Israel v.
Prime Minister, [47] 1 P.D. 37 (1992) (Isr.).
172. 1976-1977 S.H. 108.
173. Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount and the Land of Israel, [471
1 P.D. at 39.
174. 1976-1977 S.H. 243, translated in L.S.I. SPECIAL VOLUME [S.V.] 34 (1977).
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"evincing resolve to betray." 75
It was in reaction to these measures that Professor Sheleff
published a newspaper article noting that "in the Golan Law
there is no annexation of the Heights ... as a result, a person
conducting negotiations with the Syrians need not be con-
cerned that he may be committing the serious offense of the
forfeiting of territory under Israeli sovereignty."17 Reacting
to the comments of Sheleff, I also published a newspaper arti-
cle presenting the position that the Golan Heights Law is to be
interpreted as annexing the Heights to Israel.177 Nonetheless,
I also added: "This does not mean that there is no valid legal
method for withdrawing from the Golan, but it must be done
by the Knesset by way of legislation. Consequently, any agree-
ment reached by the Prime Minister within the framework of
the peace talks with Syria, is subject to the approval of the
Knesset."78
Meanwhile, on Januray 10, 1993, judgment was rendered
in the petition of the Movement of the Faithful of the Temple
Mount and the Land of Israel,'79 regarding the peace talks.
The petition was rejected.
In his article Sheleff presents the petition as having been
rejected out of hand for the reason that the topic was non-justi-
ciable' These remarks are not accurate. It is true that the
Court noted that "a petition of this nature ... its clear inten-
tion being the manner of conduct of foreign policy of the state
of Israel by the authority empowered to do so ... does not
belong in this Court." However, the Deputy President, who
gave the main opinion, addressed the issue at hand in order
"to expunge the respondents from any suspicion of a criminal
offense... of treason... and not to rest content with the
rejection of the petition by virtue of the reason that this topic
is not worthy of inclusion in the community of petitions coming
175. Id., translated in L.S.I. S.V. 35 (1977).
176. Leon Sheleff, There is a Limited Legal Arrangement in the Golan, YEDIOTH
AHRONOT, Sept. 14, 1992. For a similar view, see ARYEH SHALEW, ISRAEL AND
SYRIA: PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GOLAN 86 (1994) ("Notably, the application of
Israeli law on the Golan Heights should not by construed as the area's annex-
ation. The fact is that Israel and Syria were to begin peace negotiations.").
177. Asher Maoz, The Status of the Golan is Identical to That of Jaffa and
Jerusalem, MAARIV, Sept. 20, 1992.
178. Id.
179. [47] 1 P.D. 37 (1992)
180. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 333 n.2.
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before this Court."'8'
Justice Elon continued and examined the relevant sections
of the Penal Law, and determined that the commission of these
offenses is dependent upon the act being committed "without
any legal authorization." The Deputy President was of the
opinion that "negotiations being conducted by the respondents
are legally authorized, by virtue of the very nature of their
roles .,182 Justice Elon concluded:
Summing up, the said provisions of the Law do not limit the
power of the executive authority to conduct political negotia-
tions according to the manner and means it deems suitable
for negotiations of this kind. This is its authority, and even
its obligation by law. It may be assumed that the government
of the state of Israel shall act within the framework of the
laws of the state, and if it arrives at any kind of agreement
in the political negotiations, the agreement shall be brought
for the approval of the Knesset."s
Do these words carry ramifications with respect to the
question of the annexation of the Golan Heights?
The answer depends on the nature of the Knesset approval
required for the agreement reached by the Government in its
negotiations with Syria. One possibility is to regard the inter-
national agreements, or at least those involving the withdraw-
al from territories occupied by the state, as requiring the ap-
proval of the Knesset. This approach is supported by the fact
that the peace agreement with Egypt, involving the withdraw-
al from the Sinai peninsula, was presented for the approval of
the Knesset.'" The agreements signed between Israel and
the PLO leading to Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
and Jericho were also presented for the Knesset's approval.
However, this approach is contradicted by the ruling of the
Supreme Court, according to which the authority to ratify in-
ternational agreements lies with the government and not the
181. Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount and the Land of Israel, [471
1 P.D. at 37, 39.
182. Id. at 41.
183. Id. at 43.
184. 85 D.K. 1882 (1979). The Camp David Agreements on A Framework For
the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel and A Framework for
Peace in the Middle East, have been approved by the Knesset. 83 D.K. 4059
(1979).
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Knesset. This view was summed up by Justice Cohn in the
Kamiar case 8 as follows:
The establishment and maintenance of international rela-
tions in general, and the conclusion of international treaties
in particular, are typical functions of the executive branch
and have nothing to do with the legislative branch. In this
respect, our constitutional position is different from that of
those states in which international treaties have the standing
of law, even of special law. In those countries the conclusion
of international treaties has a legislative implication. This is
not the case here, where no international treaty possesses
legislative effect so long as it is not accompanied by specific
legislation by the Knesset. It follows that the division of pow-
ers is properly maintained. In the event that an international
treaty requires legislation, whether because its provisions
might have an influence on the existing law, or because it
contains obligations which cannot be implemented without
legislation, the Knesset will be asked to pass the necessary
legislation or to confer on some other organ the power to pro-
mulgate the appropriate subsidiary legislation, otherwise the
treaty will be incapable of implementation. But a treaty
which can be implemented by the government in the course
of the normal transaction of public business or which reflects
the existing laws no longer concerns the Knesset but is the
business of the government alone.'86
In its judgment in the Temple Mount Faithful, the Court
did not explain the nature of the approval by the Knesset re-
quired for possible agreements that may be reached by the
Government in its contacts with Syria. Even so, bearing in
mind the laws relating to the power to draw up international
185. Kamiar v. Israel, [22] 2 P.D. 85 (Isr. Crim. App. 1967), translated in 44
I.L.R. 197.
186. Id. at 97, translated in 44 I.L.R. at 255; see also Ruth Lapidoth, On the
Validity of the Convention on Extradition Between Israel and Switzerland, 22
HAPRARLIT 328, 341 (1966); Yehuda Z. Blum, The Ratification of Treaties in Israel,
2 ISR. L. REv. 120, 126 (1967). But see RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38, at 82-83: "Over
the years a practice has developed by which the Government brings any agree-
ment involving the forfeit of territories currently in its possession, for the debate
and ratification of the Knesset." Section 4 of the Government Rules of Procedure,
approved on March 25, 1984, provides that "the ratification of an international
treaty shall be brought to a Government meeting, ten copies of it having already
been sent to the Secretariat of the Knesset for a period of two weeks, for the
information of the Members of Knesset, unless the submission of the copies of the
Treaty to the Secretariat is impossible due to reasons of urgency or secrecy."
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agreements in the name of the state, and the conditions under
which the involvement of the Knesset is required in order to
make them executable, it would seem that the Court was of
the opinion that the Golan is legally a part of Israel, and that
in the absence of an amendment being introduced by the
Knesset into the law, the state is unable to forfeit any of its
territories.'87 This conclusion is also in harmony with the fact
that my article The Status of the Golan is Identical to that of
Jaffa and Jerusalem,' in which the above opinion was ex-
pressed in language echoing that used in the judgement, was
submitted to the Court by the parties' advocates. Thus, Justice
Elon was aware of the article when writing his opinion. This
conclusion also seems likely given the fact that the Court di-
rected the petitioners "to bring about the debate and delibera-
tion..., of this matter by the legislature and the executive au-
thorities."89
VIII. EPILOGUE
The interesting, perhaps even ironic point in the dispute
between Sheleff and myself is that the question of whether it
was the intention of the legislature in passing the Golan
Heights Law to annex the Heights to Israel, and if it succeeded
in doing so, while being a matter of far reaching political sig-
nificance, is of marginal importance when it comes to munici-
pal law.9 ' For the jurist only has what the law determines.
The Golan Heights Law brought the Golan Heights under the
wings of Israeli law. Regardless of the interpretation of the
law, it is indisputable that what has been enacted by the legis-
187. This conclusion is not necessary if we accept Rubinstein's opinion with
respect to the evolution of a convention regarding the forfeiting of territory cur-
rently in the possession of the State. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 38. However, it
would appear that this is not a binding legal practice. The law is that "the Gov-
ernment is entitled to decide according to its own discretion, that a certain treaty,
of particular importance, shall be presented for the approval of the Knesset, as
was done with the Camp David Accords, and the Peace Agreement with Egypt."
International Treaties: Process of Ratification - The Knesset and the Government,
DIRECTIVES OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. No. 64,OOOA.
188. See Maoz, supra note 177.
189. Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount and the Land of Israel v.
Prime Minister, [47] 1 P.D. 37 (1992) (Isr.).
190. Arguably, this may explain why Professor Dinstein called for the avoid-
ance of the word "annexation" and for concentration on "actions" rather than "dem-
onstrations." Dinstein, supra note 47, at 522.
393
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
lature may not be revoked by the government. In order to
arrive at this conclusion, we could rest content with the formu-
la presented in Kang,'9' (which in Sheleffs opinion does not
constitute "judicial recognition of the fact of annexation") ac-
cording to which "any mention of the terms 'Israel' or 'the
state' or 'the state of Israel,' in the legislation refers to the
Golan Heights."92 In view of this formula we should take
note of section 97(b) of the Penal Law that was discussed in
the Temple Mount Faithful.9' The section refers to a person
who "with intent that any area be withdrawn from the sover-
eignty of the state or placed under the sovereignty of a foreign
state commits an act calculated to bring this about." There can
be no doubt that the "area" referred to in this sub-section is
"any area of Israel" or of the "state" or of the "state of Israel."
As a result thereof, section 97(b) would be applicable with
regard to the area of the Golan Heights, which is also within
the purview of "area of Israel." The conclusion must be that for
as long as the Knesset fails to adopt measures to remove this
"area" (namely - Golan Heights) from the definition of "area of
Israel" sub-section 97(b) referring to the offense of "impairment
of sovereignty or integrity of state" remains applicable.'94
Furthermore, if indeed the ownership of Syrian land was
transferred to Israel, then the Basic Law-Israel Lands, would
also prevent the Government from returning this land to Syria.
Section 1 of the Basic Law provides that "[t]he ownership of
Israel Lands, being the lands in Israel of the state.., shall
not be transferred either by sale or in any other manner."'95
Now, since we are obliged to read the term "lands in Isra-
el" as including lands in the Golan Heights, this provision may
prevent the government from making any territorial conces-
sions in the Golan for as long as the Golan Heights Law re-
mains in force.
Moreover, even if we accept the minimalist approach of
191. See Kang Abou Tzalach v. Minister of the Interior, [37] 2 P.D. 718 (1983)
(Isr.).
192. Id. at 720.
193. See Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount and the Land of Israel,
[47] 1 P.D. at 37.
194. Indeed, in view of this conclusion, it is unclear how one may reconcile
Kang Abou Tzalach, [37] 2 P.D. at 718, with the argument that it does not consti-
tute recognition of the annexation of the Heights.
195. 1960-1961 S.H. 56, translated in 14 L.S.I. 482 (1961).
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Sheleff, that the law "does no more than what is written
therein; apply Israeli law, administration and government to
the Golan Heights,"196 what the law has done cannot be re-
versed except by virtue of another law that revokes that action.
Sheleff's assumption that the government has the authority to
withdraw from the Golan Heights "without explicit Israeli
legislation" is different from the further question of whether
the Golan Heights was in fact annexed to Israel.'97
I have my doubts as to whether the question of the annex-
ation shall necessitate judicial discussion, even if the Govern-
ment attempts to withdraw from areas in the Heights, without
receiving the blessing of the Knesset. In order to avoid that
result, there is no need for such a determination. For the ne-
cessity of "the approval of the Knesset" for the forfeiting of
areas in the Golan Heights was clearly recognized by the Su-
preme Court in the Movement of the The Faithful of the Temple
Mount and the Land of Israel v. Prime Minister,9 ' and is
necessary according to any interpretation that may be given to
the Golan Heights Law.'99
I have similar doubts that "those legal bodies involved in
the negotiations" really need "the legal community to correctly
define the situation."00 It is entirely possible that those con-
ducting the negotiations on the part of Israel, will prefer to
continue the negotiations, while maintaining the vagueness of
the current legal situation, unless they deem it profitable to
make political use of the fact of annexation; diplomacy and law
do not necessarily coincide.
196. Sheleff, supra note 1, at 337.
197. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 333.
198. [47] 1 P.D. 37 (1992) (Isr.).
199. An original method of avoiding the need to obtain the Knesset's approval
for the ceding of the Golan was suggested by Shalew. SHALEW, supra note 176, at
86-87. After noting that "new legislation would be required .. to annul the
Golan Heights Law," Shalew observes that such a move "would almost certainly
generate considerable parliamentary opposition." SHALEWV, supra note 176, at 86-87.
He therefore raises a scenario under which Israel would withdraw from the Golan,
and subsequently "Syria might forego the law's repeal, as it would no longer have
practical significance." SHALEW, supra note 176, at 86-87. I am unable to under-
stand Shalew's opinion, as it seems to propose that the Israeli Government strike
a deal with the Syrian Government in order to circumvent the Knesset. Needless
to say, in view of the above analysis, this suggestion, besides its other basic de-
fects, is illegal.
200. See Sheleff, supra note 1, at 333 n.2.
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The issue of a peace agreement with Syria together with
the issue of the withdrawal from any of the areas of the Golan
Heights, and of their transfer to Syrian authority, are and
shall remain at the forefront of the political arena. These is-
sues will have to find their solution in the Knesset and the
government, not in the works of legal scholars.20 '
201. I will not address an additional question at this juncture, namely does the
step of receiving the Knesset's approval require the ratification of the citizenry
whether by elections to the Knesset or via a referendum? From my point of view
this question also belongs to the area of politics and not to the domain of law.
For discussion of the point see Schochtman, supra note 73, at 17-18. In his article,
Professor Schochtman further recommends that the best way for this to occur is to
entrench the subject of sovereignty by requiring a special majority of at least two
thirds of the Members of the Knesset on a matter as fateful for the future of the
Jewish people and the state of Israel as amending the Golan Heights Law.
Schochtman, supra note 73, at 18.
Indeed, several draft bills for the entrenchment of the Golan Heights Law
were recently presented to the Knesset and rejected by it. The authority of the
Knesset to entrench its laws against changes by a simple majority of the Knesset
stems from its constituent powers. See Asher Maoz, The System of Government in
Israel, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 9, 15 (1988). The question of whether the Knesset
may achieve this goal by way of regular laws as opposed to Basic Laws is outside
the scope of this paper. It was addressed by Justice Aharon Barak in his article
The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 9, 6-
20 (1992).
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